We propose a polynomial-time attack on the hHB protocol, showing that the protocol does not attain the security it claims. Our attack is based on the attack introduced in [2] .
Introduction
In the modern era of cryptography, researchers have struggled with finding lowcost cryptographic primitives suitable for simplistic hardware environments such as RFID tags and low-power/cost devices. A popular source of inspiration is the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, which has roots in machine learning theory but now has gained a lot of popularity among cryptographers. The LPN problem is strongly related to the problem of decoding random linear codes, which probably is the most important problem in coding theory. Being supposedly hard, LPN plays an important role in post-quantum cryptography in contrast to classic number theoretic problems. LPN consists of very basic arithmetic operations and is therefore a perfect fit for light-weight cryptography.
The first 'real' cryptographic construction based on LPN was the HopperBlum (HB) protocol [5] -a minimalistic protocol being secure in a passive attack model. Juels and Weis [6] , and Katz and Shin [7] proposed a modified protocol, HB + , which aimed to be secure also in the active attack model by extending HB with one extra round. However, Gilbert et al. [2] later showed that the HB + protocol is vulnerable to active attacks, i.e., man-in-the-middle attacks. Later, Gilbert et al. [3] proposed a variant of the Hopper-Blum protocol called HB # . Some of the more recent contributions to LPN-based constructions are a tworound identification protocol called Lapin, proposed by Heyse et al. [4] , and an LPN-based encryption scheme called Helen, proposed by Duc and Vaudenay [1] . The Lapin protocol is based on an LPN variant called Ring-LPN, where the samples are elements of a polynomial ring.
Khoureich proposed in [8] a new version of HB called hHB (harder HB ), which aims to repair susceptibility against GRS attacks. In this paper, we show that this is not the case.
The hHB protocol
The author of [8] argues that the weakness of HB is due to that the secret x does not change over time. The hHB protocol is built upon the hypothesis; by employing a way of (presumably) securely transmitting a secret session value and letting x take this value, [8] aims to patch this weakness. Once the session value has been transmitted, the verifier in the hHB protocol runs the standard HB protocol to verify the tag. The hHB protocol is outlined in Protocol 1.
The function used by the reader to transmit session values τ, ξ 0 , ξ 1 ,
is defined in Algorithm 1. Similarly, the inverse function used by the tag to decode session values τ, ξ 0 , ξ 1 ,
is given in Algorithm 2.
The attack
We will now proceed with describing our attack. We use a method very similiar to that of [2] .
Triple (α, β, γ)
Output:
Determining secret y
The tag sends the following
The verifier checks if the following is satisfied
which is expected to be true for r·E (ν = 0) = r·ǫ of the r samples. If the number of correct equations are above some threshold, the verifier accepts. Otherwise the verifier rejects. First, we ignore the x vector. By intercepting the communication between the tag and the verifier, we are able to perturbe the interchanged bits. To determine the value of bit of y at index i, we run the following steps.
1. Let the tag and verifier exchange the session value. For now, this is ignored.
2. When the tag sends b, we flip the ith bit. So,
3. Then, we let the tag and verifier run the r steps. If the reader returns accept, then the bit y i is very likely to be 0. Naturally, we may amplify the probability of a correct guess by re-running the procedure for the same bit b i .
4. By repeating for all k bits, we can determine the secret value y.
Determining secret s
The second stage of the attack aims to determine the secret vector s. In the very first step of exchanging the session value p 0 is always 0 |s] , which is the key to our exploit. To determine the value of bit of s at index j, we run the following steps.
1. In the first step of the session-value exchange, flip the jth bit in c 1 . As a result, we have
where δ j is a vector with 1 on index j and all-zero on the remaing indices. Hence,
Applying the same procedure to c 2 and c 3 , we are able to conditionally flip also λ 2 and λ 3 .
2. If the two values satisfy ξ 0 = ξ 1 (which is true with probability 1 2 ), then x will be perturbed at position 0, i.e., x 0 ← x 0 ⊕ 1. Everything else remains the same.
3. When the tag is verfied against the reader, we set the jth bit of a to always be 1. Hence, the tag will compute
where P (φ = 1) = 1 2 . So, if s j = 1, then the reader will output reject with probability 1 2 . Running the procedure a polynomial number of times for the same index j will give a good estimate of s j .
Implementation of hHB and the MITM attack can be found at [9] .
